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INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATESThe United States respectfully submits this amicus brief pursuantto Fed. R. App. P. 29(a) and this Court’s order of April 30, 2012.  TheUnited States’ interest in the issues discussed herein is noted in itsoriginal amicus brief in this case.QUESTION PRESENTEDWhat is the applicability of the Supreme Court’s decision in MayoCollaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.1289 (2012), to Myriad’s isolated DNA claims and to method claim 20 ofthe ’282 patent? STATEMENT1.  The district court held invalid fifteen claims from sevenpatents concerning the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes exclusively licensedto Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad).  See A89-253; 702 F. Supp. 2d 181(S.D.N.Y. 2010).  On Myriad’s appeal to this Court, the United Statesfiled an amicus brief in support of neither party.  The United Statesevaluated the composition claims in light of the established exception to35 U.S.C. § 101 for products of nature, and concluded that althoughman-made complementary DNA molecules (cDNA) — which comprise
nucleotide sequences that do not exist in nature — are patent-eligiblesubject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, isolated but otherwise unalteredgenomic DNA molecules are unpatentable products of nature. With respect to the challenged composition claims, a panel of thisCourt unanimously held that cDNA molecules are patent-eligible, butdivided regarding the patent eligibility of isolated but otherwiseunmodified DNA.  See 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).    2.  After this Court denied cross-petitions for panel rehearing,appellees filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.  While the petition waspending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Mayo.  There theCourt addressed the validity of a process patent that “purport[ed] toapply” what the Court concluded were “natural laws describing therelationships between the concentration in the blood of certainthiopurine metabolites and the likelihood that the drug dosage will beineffective or induce harmful side-effects.”  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. The Court concluded that the patented claims were invalid becausethey effectively claimed the natural law that they described.The Court began its analysis by reiterating the longstanding“implicit exception” to patent eligibility under § 101 for “[l]aws of
2
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”  Id. at 1293 (internalquotation marks omitted) (citing, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).  “Thus,” the Court explained, it had held that “anew mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild isnot patentable subject matter,” and “[l]ikewise, Einstein could notpatent his celebrated law that E=mc .”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks2omitted).  The Court reiterated that “‘[s]uch discoveries are“manifestations of * * * nature, free to all men and reserved exclusivelyto none.’””  Ibid. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, and FunkBrothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).The Court discussed its prior precedents that warn againstupholding patents that “too broadly preempt the use of a natural law”and require patentees to add sufficient elements “to ensure that thepatent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon thenatural law itself.”  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.  The Court concluded thatthe metabolite correlations described in the challenged patents arenatural laws, and that the patent claims did not “add enough to theirstatements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe toqualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws.”  Id. at
3
1296-97.  The Court emphasized that a process utilizing a natural lawis not patent-eligible “unless that process has additional features thatprovide practical assurance that the process is more than a draftingeffort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”  Id. at 1297. After issuing its decision in Mayo, the Supreme Court granted thepetition in this case, vacated this Court’s judgment, and remanded forfurther proceedings in light of Mayo.  See 132 S. Ct. 1794.  ARGUMENTMayo Supports The View That Isolated Genomic DNA Is NotPatent-Eligible Under 35 U.S.C. § 101.As the United States explained in its original amicus brief, unlikecDNA, isolated but otherwise unmodified DNA molecules are notpatent-eligible because they are “‘products of nature,’” not “‘human-made inventions.’”  U.S. Amicus Br. at 14 (quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply,Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (quotingChakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313)).  Patent protection is not available tothose who simply discover existing aspects of nature, even if thediscovery requires arduous work, represents keen scientific insight, andis of great value to society.  Mayo underscores this fundamentallimitation on patent protection.  See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293
4
(discussing this “important implicit exception” to § 101).  As discussedbelow, the Court’s guidance on policing this limitation reinforces theconclusion that Myriad cannot patent DNA it discovered in and isolatedfrom nature.I. Mayo Implies That A Composition Claim Is Not Patent-Eligible If It Effectively Precludes The Public From UsingA Product Of Nature.The principal issue in this appeal is whether composition claimsfor isolated genomic DNA are directed to patent-eligible subject matteror, instead, whether such claims are impermissible attempts to patentproducts of nature.   The answer to that question turns on the relation-1ship between the claimed compositions and naturally occurring DNA.To be eligible for a patent, a claimed composition must be“human-made” and “markedly different” from a naturally occurringsubstance.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310, 313.  The members of thispanel agreed on that basic proposition.  See 653 F.3d at 1350-51(Lourie, J.); id. at 1359-60 (Moore, J., concurring in part); id. at 1379(Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  But the panel
  Plaintiffs also challenge Myriad’s method claims.  See Appellees’1Br. at 52-60.  The United States takes no position on this issue.5
members parted company in applying that general principle to thecomposition claims at issue here.  More specifically, the panel membersdisagreed about whether distinctions between isolated and genomicDNA are significant enough to render isolated DNA “markedlydifferent” for § 101 purposes.The Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo provides guidance regard-ing that question.  To be sure, that guidance is indirect.  Mayo involvesprocess, not composition, claims, and the Court’s analysis focuses onthe standards for determining whether a claimed process effectivelyclaims a law of nature.  Thus, Mayo does not directly address thecriteria to be used in deciding the parameters of the product-of-natureexception, and every nuance of the Court’s analysis may notmechanically extend to products of nature.  Nevertheless, in at leastone respect, Mayo provides an important point of reference for decidingwhether a claimed composition and a naturally occurring substance are“markedly different” for purposes of § 101.In analyzing the claimed methods in Mayo, the Supreme Courtrepeatedly emphasized the need to ensure that claims not “tie up” lawsof nature by preventing the public from exploring and exploiting those
6
laws.  See, e.g., 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (warning “against upholding patentsthat claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a naturallaw”); id. at 1301 (“The Court has repeatedly emphasized . . . thatpatent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up thefuture use of laws of nature.”); ibid. (warning against the “danger thatthe grant of patents that tie up [natural laws’] use will inhibit futureinnovation premised upon them”).  To avoid that outcome, the Courtheld that a “process reciting a law of nature” is not patent-eligible“unless that process has additional features that provide practicalassurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed tomonopolize the law of nature itself.”  Id. at 1297.  With respect to themethod claims in Mayo, the Court concluded that “the steps addnothing of significance to the natural laws themselves” and “amount[]to nothing significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply theapplicable laws when treating their patients.”  Id. at 1298, 1302.  Forthat reason, upholding such claims “would risk disproportionately tyingup the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in themaking of further discoveries.”  Id. at 1294; see also id. at 1302
7
(discussing “basic underlying concern that these patents tie up toomuch future use of laws of nature”).2The concerns implicated by patent claims that “t[ie] up the use ofthe underlying natural laws,” and thereby “inhibit[] their use in themaking of further discoveries,” may also be present when a patentcontains a composition claim that relates to a product of nature. Products of nature, like laws of nature, are “manifestations of * * *nature” that are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Acomposition claim that effectively prevents the public from studyingand making use of a product of nature is just as objectionable, and forthe same underlying reason, as a method claim that effectivelyprevents the public from studying and exploiting a law of nature.Mayo thus suggests one way (though by no means the exclusiveway) for determining whether proffered differences between a claimed
  The Court also pointed to the conventional nature of the steps2added to the underlying nature law in the challenged claims.  See, e.g.,132 S. Ct. at 1294.  The Court did not suggest, however, that a patent isinvalid simply because it incorporates a known process or otherinvention.  Such a rule would be at odds with 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), whichdefines “process” to include “a new use of a known process, machine,manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”8
composition and a product of nature suffice to render the composition“markedly different” under Chakrabarty and related precedents.  Mayosuggests that a court should ask whether a patent on the claimedcomposition has the practical effect of preempting the public’s ability touse the product of nature itself.  Issuance of a patent should leaveothers free to study and exploit the natural substance and to deviseother alterations to it.  If it does not, that is a strong indication that thedifferences between the claimed composition and the product of natureare insufficient to render the composition patent-eligible.In Chakrabarty, for example, the patent the Supreme Courtupheld on a genetically altered bacterium would not have interferedwith the public’s ability to investigate or further modify the originalbacterium or to experiment on the DNA plasmids that the patenteeinserted into it to create the “new bacterium.”  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.at 310; see also id. at 305 n.1 (discussing insertion of “four differentplasmids, capable of degrading four different oil components” into abacterium).  Similarly, cDNA molecules, which must be synthesized byscientists in the laboratory, are not created in the process of studying
9
native DNA and pose little risk of preempting study of naturallyoccurring DNA.  See U.S. Amicus Br. at 15-16; A134.In contrast, patents on isolated but otherwise unmodified DNAwould significantly impair the public’s ability to study and make use ofgenomic DNA.  As Judge Bryson explained in dissent, “[t]he onlymaterial change to those genes” is that “necessarily incidental to theextraction of the genes from the environment in which they are foundin nature.”  653 F.3d at 1375.  And, as is true in many fields, removingthe product of nature from its natural surroundings is a prerequisite toany serious study or commercial exploitation of native DNA.   If the3
  DNA sequencing technologies rely on isolating and breaking3down DNA into segments shorter than — and thus potentiallycontained within — the BRCA genes.  See, e.g., Rizzo & Buck, KeyPrinciples and Clinical Applications of “Next-Generation” DNASequencing, Cancer Prevention Research, 1-5 (published online beforeprint May 22, 2012, DOI:10.1158/1940-6207.CAPR-11-0432) (PubMedID # 22617168) (discussing “first-generation” automated Sangersequencing that “can read DNA fragments of 500 [base pairs] to 1[kilobase] in length” and “next-generation sequencing” technologiesthat “offer shorter average read lengths (30–400 [base pairs])”); Kepleret al., Metastasizing patent claims on BRCA1, Genomics, 95, 312-314(2010) (estimating that “most human genes contain at least one andusually several oligonucleotides covered by” claim 5 of Myriad’s ’282patent, and noting that “if full-genome sequence analysis becomesfeasible,” claim 5 “would likely be deemed to be infringed by any form ofgenomic sequencing”).  Moreover, even those emerging technologiesthat aim to sequence longer DNA strands still rely on its isolation, and10
process of removing the product from its natural environmentnecessarily results in creation of the patented composition (and thus ininfringement of the patent) — as is the case here  — the patent on the4composition is in practical effect a patent on the product of natureitself.  The “markedly different” standard is a flexible one, but Mayosuggests that it should interpreted and administered in a way thatavoids this result.   Thus, Mayo provides guidance to courts attempting5
could require creation of gene-length segments, thus potentiallyinfringing even Myriad’s gene-length isolated DNA claims.  SeeHayden, Nanopore genome sequencer makes its debut, Nature News,February 17, 2012 (available at http://www.nature.com/news/nanopore-genome-sequencer-makes-its-debut-1.10051, last visited June 14, 2012)(discussing new nanopore technology that could sequence DNA strands100,000 base pairs long).  Myriad relies entirely on the fact of isolation to assert that its4isolated DNA claims fall within § 101.  See U.S. Amicus Br. at 20(noting that absent the limitation of “isolation,” Myriad’s claims wouldencompass genes in the human body).  Anyone who isolated eitherBRCA gene, or any fragment thereof at least fifteen nucleotides long,would infringe one or more of Myriad’s contested claims.  As explained in the United States’ original amicus brief, the5Supreme Court has also identified the creation of new utility — asdistinct from potential applications of a substance’s inherent properties— as an indication of patent eligibility.  See U.S. Amicus Br. at 13-14(pointing to Chakrabarty’s invocation of the new bacterium’s “potentialfor significant utility”); id. at 32-33 (“[T]he mere act of culling a naturalproduct from its environment to uncover or exploit its preexistingnatural qualities or functions — however useful those qualities orfunctions may be — is insufficient to create patentable subject11
to determine when a change to a product of nature is “significant” or“marked” enough “in terms of patent law’s objectives” to qualify forpatent protection.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.The members of this panel all relied on Chakrabarty’s “markedlydifferent” rubric but disagreed about how to apply that standard toDNA isolated from nature.  See 653 F.3d at 1351-53 (Lourie, J.); id. at1364-68 (Moore, J.); id. at 1374-75 (Bryson, J.).  In light of Mayo, thisCourt should not rest patent-eligibility on the bare fact that isolatinggenes or gene segments involves the breaking of chemical bonds, or onthe fact that scientists can use small gene segments to exploit theinherent chemical properties of DNA in ways that cannot be done withcomplete genes.   Instead, the Court should also ask whether the6
matter[.]”); id. at 34 (noting that isolated DNA “may have morepotential applications than human genes in their natural context,” butthat “the same is equally true of mined coal, separated cotton fibers,pure metallic lithium, ductile uranium, and other products of naturewhose industrial value to mankind likewise arises when they areextracted from their naturally occurring environments”).  The patent claims themselves do not refer to the chemical6characteristics of isolated DNA invoked by the members of the panelmajority.  See 653 F.3d at 1351-53, 1361-65.  Thus, assuming that themajority’s chemical descriptions are accurate, it is clear that thosecharacteristics are simply a consequence of separating DNA from itsnative environment. 12
differences identified in the original panel decision are sufficient toleave the public free to study and exploit the native BRCA1 and BRCA2genes.  The answer to that question is no, and this Court shouldconclude that the claims directed at isolated but otherwise unmodifiedDNA are invalid under § 101.7II.  Mayo Indicates That The Asserted Need For FinancialIncentives In A Particular Field Does Not Alter § 101.There is another respect in which Mayo illuminates the § 101 analysis here.  In Mayo, the patent owner argued “that a principle oflaw denying patent coverage here will interfere significantly with theability of medical researchers to make valuable discoveries.”  132 S. Ct.at 1304.  Although the Supreme Court’s analysis of § 101 reflects ageneralized balancing between providing financial incentives forinnovation and preventing unduly broad and preemptive monopolies,the Court declined to give weight to the patentee’s field-specific policy
  This Court can hold that isolated DNA is not patent-eligible7without determining whether, or under what circumstances, patentsmay be granted on “purified” versions of naturally occurringsubstances.  See U.S. Amicus Br. at 30-31.  “Purification” may involvesubstantial manipulations undertaken after the naturally occurringsubstance has been removed from its native environment, cf. 653 F.3dat 1377 n.4 (Bryson, J., dissenting in part), and could well leave thepublic free to study and exploit the product of nature itself.13
argument.  See id. at 1304-05.  Noting that the two sides and theirrespective amici disagreed over the practical impact of according patentprotection to the challenged methods, the Court stated that it did “notfind this kind of difference of opinion surprising,” since “[p]atentprotection is, after all, a two-edged sword” that forecloses some forms ofinnovation while protecting others.  Id. at 1305.  The Court expressedreluctance about “departing from established general legal rules lest anew protective rule that seems to suit the needs of one field produceunforeseen results in another.”  Ibid.  The Court thus refused todetermine whether it was “desirable” to “increase[] protection fordiscoveries” concerning “diagnostic laws of nature” specifically.  Ibid.In this case, Myriad has argued that the extension of patentprotection to isolated DNA is necessary in order to preserve financialincentives for making DNA discoveries.  See, e.g., Myriad Opening Br.at 3-4.  Mayo strongly suggests that the judicial inquiry should notfocus on industry-specific incentive arguments of this sort, pro or con,and instead should focus on  “established general legal rules.”  See U.S.Amicus Br. at 34-36 (arguing that appellants’ assertions regardingfinancial incentives do not distinguish isolated genes from other, clearly
14
unpatentable products of nature).  The potential incentive effects ofallowing private parties to monetize discoveries about a particularnaturally occurring product do not alter the boundaries the SupremeCourt has set — and in Mayo reinforced — between unpatentableproducts of nature and patentable creations of man.CONCLUSIONFor the reasons stated above and in the United States’ originalamicus brief, the Court should reverse the district court’s invalidationof the composition claims that are limited to cDNAs and similar man-made constructs, but affirm the district court’s conclusion that theclaims encompassing isolated human genomic DNA are invalid. 
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